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HAVE AMERICAN INDIANS BEEN WRITTEN OUT OF
THE RELIGIOUS FREEDOM RESTORATION ACT?
Jessica M. Wiles*
Haiya naiya yana,
I have come upon it, I have come upon blessing,
People, my relatives, I have come upon blessing,
People, my relatives, blessed.
-Navajo Blessingway Song**
I. INTRODUCTION
The San Francisco Peaks rise in dramatic isolation nearly a mile above
the surrounding grasslands and pine forests of Northern Arizona to a height
of over 12,000 feet.1 The Peaks consist of four separate summits,
Humphrey's Peak, Agassiz Peak, Doyle Peak, and Fremont Peak, which
together form a single mountain visible on the horizon for over 100 miles in
any direction. 2 No fewer than 13 American Indian tribes including the
Hopi, Navajo, Hualapai, Havasupai, Yavapai, Zuni, Southern Paiute,
Acoma, and five Apache Tribes ("the Tribes") hold the Peaks to be sacred
and an integral part of their religion.3 Yet the San Francisco Peaks are
owned by the federal government as part of the Coconino National Forest,
not by any American Indian tribe.4
A controversy currently centers on the most sacred or holy of the
Peaks-Humphrey's Peak.5 Humphrey's is the highest point in the State of
Arizona at 12,633 feet 6 and is not only important to American Indians, but
also to a myriad of other interests, such as sheep and cattle grazing, timber
harvesting, mining, mountain biking, hiking, camping, and downhill ski-
* J.D. and Certificate of Environmental and Natural Resources Law expected May 2010, Lewis
and Clark Law School; B.S. 2001 University of Montana (Recreation Resource Management). The au-
thor would like to thank Professor Robert Miller for his invaluable guidance and editing of this article.
** J. Frisbie and David P. McAllester, Navajo Blessingway Singer, the Autobiography of Frank
Mitchell 1881-1967 (U. N.P. Press 1978).
1. John D. Grahame & Thomas D. Sisk, Canyons, Cultures and Environmental Change: An Intro-
duction to the Land-use History of the Colorado Plateau: San Francisco Peaks, Arizona, http:/
cpluhna.nau.edu/Places/sanfranciscopeaks.htm 1 (accessed Apr. 7, 2010).
2. James A. Hardy, The History of the San Francisco Peaks 2 (Brochure of the Flagstaff Visitor
Center) (2007) (available at http://www.flagstaffarizona.org/downloads/visitors/peaks-history.pdf); see
also Navajo Nation v. U.S. Forest Serv., 535 F.3d 1058, 1081 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc) (Fletcher, J.,
dissenting); Grahame & Sisk, supra n. 1, at 1.
3. Hardy, supra n. 2, at 1.
4. Navajo Nation, 535 F.3d at 1064 (majority).
5. Id. at 1082, 1098 (Fletcher, J., dissenting).
6. Hardy, supra n. 2, at 2.
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ing.7 Humphrey's Peak is also home to one of the longest continuously
operated ski resorts in the country, the Arizona Snowbowl ("Snowbowl"),
established in 1938.8 The Snowbowl operates under a special use permit
from the United States Forest Service ("Forest Service"). 9
American Indian tribes and the Snowbowl developers have been at
odds over development on the Peaks for over 20 years.10 All the while, the
Forest Service has been in a tough balancing act between competing inter-
ests including tribal religious concerns, various recreational uses, and eco-
nomic development." Although each side has had its successes, 12 each has
also had its failures.13 The latest disappointment for American Indians was
the Forest Service's approval of the Snowbowl developers' preferred alter-
native and planned expansion of the resort in a February 2005 Final Envi-
ronmental Impact Statement and Record of Decision.' 4
In this decision, the Forest Service approved the Snowbowl's proposal
to make artificial snow using treated sewage effluent, euphemistically
named "reclaimed water."' 5 The treated sewage effluent would be pumped
uphill nearly 14 miles from the town of Flagstaff and stored in a ten million
7. Navajo Nation, 535 F.3d at 1064 n. 4 (majority).
8. Daniel Kraker, On Sacred Snow: Culture and Commerce Clash Over Development on Ari-
zona's San Francisco Peaks, 20 Am. Indian Rep. 6 (Apr. 2004).
9. Navajo Nation, 535 F.3d at 1064.
10. Boone Cragun, Student Author, A Snowbowl Dji Vu, The Battle Between Native American
Tribes and the Arizona Snowbowl, 30 Am. Indian L. Rev. 165, 182 (2005).
11. Kraker, supra n. 8, at 7 (quoting Gene Waldrip, district ranger within the Coconino National
Forest, as stating "We have perspectives all the way from a religious and spiritual viewpoint, to the
skier, or to the hiker, and all the other thousands of people who want to use the Peaks.").
12. Id. (stating that in the 1970s, the Tribes managed to defeat a proposal to build luxury condos, a
golf course, swimming pools, and trout ponds at the base of the ski resort).
13. Id. (stating that less than a year after the Tribes defeated the building of luxury condos the
Forest Service approved the first major expansion of the Snowbowl); see also Wilson v. Block, 708 F.2d
735, 739 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (a failed 1981 lawsuit brought by the Navajo Medicinemen's Association, the
Hopi Tribe, and nearby ranchers under the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment to halt further
development of the Snowbowl and to remove existing ski facilities); see also Klara Bonsack Kelley &
Harris Francis, Navajo Sacred Places 170 (Indiana U. Press 1994) (stating that after the defeat in Wil-
son, the Navajo Nation acquired a Forest Service grazing lease for nearly all the land around the Peaks
themselves to keep development at a minimum, but this strategy has hardly worked due to increased
tourism, the construction of a natural gas pipeline, and fiber-optic buried cables).
14. Navajo Nation v. U.S. Forest Serv., 408 F. Supp. 2d 866, 871 (D. Ariz. 2006) (stating "The
Forest Service's ROD approved, in part: (a) approximately 205 acres of snowmaking coverage through-
out the area, utilizing reclaimed water; (b) a 10 million-gallon reclaimed water reservoir near the top
terminal of the existing chairlift and catchments pond below Hart Prairie Lodge; (c) construction of a
reclaimed water pipeline between Flagstaff and the Snowbowl with booster stations and pump houses;
(d) construction of 3,000 to 4,000 square foot snowmaking control building; (e) construction of a new
10,000 square foot guest services facility; (f) an increase in skiable acreage from 139 to 205 acres - an
approximate 47% increase; and (g) approximately 47 acres of thinning and 87 acres of grading/stumping
and smoothing.").
15. Id. at 877.
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gallon holding tank near the top of the ski lifts.16 The purpose of the pro-
ject, according to the Forest Service, is "to ensure a consistent and reliable
operating season, thereby maintaining the economic viability of the
Snowbowl, and stabilizing employment levels and winter tourism within
the local community," as well as improving the safety of skiing condi-
tions.17 To the tribes who consider the mountain to be sacred, spraying up
to 1.5 million gallons of treated sewage effluent per day on the Peaks would
be nothing short of sacrilege.' 8
In response, the Tribes, several individual tribal members, and envi-
ronmental groups sued the Forest Service. 19 The plaintiffs, however, did
not use the typical environmental law approach to challenging such agency
actions (e.g. filing a lawsuit under the National Environmental Policy Act.20
Instead, they petitioned for an injunction against the Snowbowl under the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act ("RFRA"), among other claims. 2 1
RFRA is a federal law enacted in 1993 to prevent government actions that
would substantially burden a person's free exercise of religion.22 The
Tribes asserted that the use of reclaimed water to make artificial snow for
skiing was a substantial burden on the free exercise of their religion. 2 3 Spe-
cifically, the Tribes argued that the physical and spiritual contamination of
the Peaks would restrict their ability to perform particular religious ceremo-
nies and to maintain daily and annual religious practices on the mountain.2 4
The original three-judge Ninth Circuit panel determined that the use of the
treated wastewater was a violation of RFRA, but an eleven-judge en banc
16. Id. at 871; see also Kraker, supra n. 8, at 6.
17. U.S. Dept. of Agric. Forest Serv., Final Environmental Impact Statement for Arizona Snowbowl
Facilities Improvements vol. 1, http://www.fs.fed.us/r3/coconino/nepa/2005/feis-snowbowl/index.shtml
1-6 (accessed Apr. 7 2010) [hereinafter Snowbowl EIS].
18. Kraker, supra n. 8, at 6; Navajo Nation, 535 F.3d at 1081 (Fletcher, J., dissenting).
19. Navajo Nation, 535 F.3d at 1063 n. 2 (majority).
20. Greg Guedel, Native American Legal Update, Can Spirituality (And the Lw) Save the Environ-
ment?, http://www.nativelegalupdate.com/tags/snowbowl/ (Jan. 27, 2009); see also Navajo Nation, 535
F.3d at 1063 (listing Tribal plaintiffs as Navajo Nation, Havasupai Tribe, White Mountain Apache Na-
tion, Yavapai-Apache Nation, Hualapai Tribe, and the Hopi Tribe. Tribal member plaintiffs include Rex
Tilousi, Dianna Uqualla, Norris Nez, and Bill Bucky Preston and environmental plaintiffs as the Flag-
staff Activist Network, the Sierra Club, and the Center for Biological Diversity).
21. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb-2000bb-4 (1993). Plaintiffs filed suit under the Religious Freedom Res-
toration Act ("RFRA"), the National Environmental Policy Act ("NEPA"), and the National Historic
Preservation Act ("NHPA"). Navajo Nation, 535 F.3d at 1063.
22. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb-2000bb-4.
23. Navajo Nation, 535 F.3d at 1063; see also Sara Brucker, Navajo Nation v. United States Forest
Service: Defining the Scope of Native American Freedom of Religious Exercise on Public lands, 31
Environs Envtl. L & Policy J. 273, 285-286 (2008).
24. Navajo Nation, 535 F.3d at 1063.
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panel of the Ninth Circuit reversed the decision. 25 The Tribes petitioned the
Supreme Court for review but were denied certiorari in June 2009.26
The Ninth Circuit en banc panel held that the use of treated sewage
effluent to make artificial snow on land sacred to the Tribes would not force
the Tribes to choose between following tenets of their religion and receiv-
ing government benefit, or coerce them to act contrary to their religious
beliefs by threat of civil or criminal sanctions.27 Therefore, the Forest Ser-
vice's actions did not "substantially burden" the Tribes' religious beliefs
within the meaning of RFRA. 2 8
This Note argues that the Ninth Circuit's holding is unduly restrictive
because it limits the interpretation of "substantial burden" to only two nar-
row situations and is in conflict with the purpose and plain language of
RFRA. Section II examines the early history of the U.S. Constitution's
Free Exercise Clause, the development of the Supreme Court's strict scru-
tiny test for Free Exercise cases, and how the Court failed to apply its own
test in Employment Division, Department of Human Resources of Oregon v.
Smith.29 Section III discusses Congress's reaction to the Smith decision and
the enactment and purpose of RFRA. Section IV explains the procedural
history of Navajo Nation v. U.S. Forest Service from the district court
through the Ninth Circuit's three-judge panel decision. Section V analyzes
the Ninth Circuit en banc opinion and its drastic narrowing of RFRA. Fi-
nally, section VI concludes that by significantly narrowing RFRA, the
Ninth Circuit effectively wrote American Indian religious claims out of
RFRA, contrary to the purpose of the statute. Ultimately, the Ninth Circuit
has undermined the ability of American Indians to freely exercise their
rights on public lands.
H. ESTABLISHMENT OF THE STRICT SCRUTINY TEST UNDER
SHERBERT AND YODER
In 1963 and 1972 the Supreme Court decided two cases, Sherbert v.
Verner30 and Wisconsin v. Yoder 31 respectively, which established the
strict scrutiny test for governmental actions that interfere with the free exer-
cise of religion. 32 In Sherbert, Adell Sherbert, a member of the Seventh-
25. Guedel, supra n. 20; Gale Courey Toensing, High Court Petitioned to Protect Sacredness,
Environmental Integrity of San Francisco Peaks, Indian Country Today (Jan 23, 2009) (available at
http://www.indiancountrytoday.com/national/38225129.html).
26. Navajo Nation, 535 F.3d 1058, cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 2763 (June. 8, 2009).
27. Id. at 1070.
28. Id.
29. Empl. Div., Dept. of Hum. Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
30. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
31. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
32. Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 403; Yoder, 406 U.S. at 214.
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day Adventist Church was fired from her job for refusing to work on Satur-
day, the Sabbath day of her faith.33  The Court held that South Carolina
could not deny her unemployment benefits because this would force her to
"choose between following the precepts of her religion and forfeiting bene-
fits, on the one hand, and abandoning one of the precepts of her religion in
order to accept work, on the other hand." 34 In addition, the Court held that
forcing her to make this choice by conditioning unemployment benefits
upon her willingness to violate her religion effectively penalized the free
exercise of her constitutional liberties, and, thus, the State of South Carolina
had violated her right to freely exercise her religion.35
In finding a violation of the Free Exercise Clause, the Court set forth
what is commonly referred to as the "substantial burden test." 3 6 The test
consists of two steps.37 First, a court must determine whether the plaintiff s
religious belief is sincerely held and, if so, whether the government action
imposes a substantial burden on the free exercise of the plaintiffs relig-
ion.38 Second, the court must determine whether the burden imposed by the
government action is outweighed by a compelling government interest and
whether the government has pursued that interest in the least restrictive
means possible.39
The Court reaffirmed the substantial burden test in Yoder.4 0  Yoder
involved a Free Exercise Clause claim brought by members of the Old Or-
der Amish religion who appealed their conviction under a Wisconsin law
that required them to send their children to school until the age of 16 in
violation of the Amish religion and way of life.41 The Court held that the
33. Id. at 399.
34. Id. at 404.
35. Id. at 406.
36. Eloise H. Bouzari, The Substantial Burden Test's Impact on the Free Exercise of Minority
Religions, 2 Tex. Forum on Civ. Liberties & Civ. Rights, 123, 123 (1996) (stating that the balancing
tests in Sherbert and Yoder have come to be called the "substantial burden test"). The test is also known
as the compelling interest test, and some scholars use the term interchangeably. Id. at n. 9.
37. Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 403 (stating "If, therefore, the decision of the South Carolina Supreme
Court is to withstand appellant's constitutional challenge, it must be either because her disqualification
as a beneficiary represents no infringement by the State of her constitutional rights of free exercise, or
because any incidental burden on the free exercise of appellant's religion may be justified by a 'compel-
ling state interest in the regulation of a subject within the State's constitutional power to regulate.'").
For analysis of the two-step process, see Bouzari, supra n. 36, at 129.
38. Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 403. No question was raised in this case concerning the sincerity of Adell
Sherbet's religious beliefs. Id. at 401 n. 1.
39. Id. at 406; see also Bouzari, supra n. 36, at 129; Douglas Laycock & Oliver S. Thomas, Inter-
preting the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 73 Tex. L. Rev. 209, 222 (1994) (stating that the "appli-
cation of the burden to the person" must be the "least restrictive means" of furthering a compelling
interest); Brucker, supra n. 23, at 276.
40. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 214.
41. Id. at 207. The Amish objection to formal education beyond the eighth grade is firmly
grounded in the central religious principles of the Amish. Id. at 210. Testimony at trial stated that high
2010 475
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Wisconsin law violated the Free Exercise Clause because the burden on
their sincere religious belief could not be overcome by any compelling state
interest.42 In essence, the Court determined that the government violates
the Free Exercise Clause when it "affirmatively compels [members of the
Old-Order Amish Mennonite Church], under threat of sanction, to perform
acts undeniably at odds with fundamental tenets of their religious beliefs." 4 3
The Sherbert and Yoder substantial burden test established that a gov-
ernment action that impinges on fundamental rights and interests protected
by the Free Exercise Clause must be balanced against a compelling state
interest.44 Moreover, the strict scrutiny standard of review required by the
compelling state interest test is not easily met because "only those interests
of the highest order and those not otherwise served can overbalance legiti-
mate claims to the free exercise of religion."45 Thus, together, Sherbert and
Yoder firmly establish that under the Free Exercise Clause the government
cannot burden an individual's sincerely held religious beliefs and conduct,
except where the government can show a compelling state interest imposed
in the least restrictive means.4 6
III. THE CREATION OF RFRA
A. The Smith Decision
In 1990, the Supreme Court decided Employment Division, Depart-
ment of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith, which significantly nar-
rowed the application of the substantial burden test.47 Congress, however,
quickly stepped in to restore Sherbert and Yoder by enacting RFRA.4 8
Smith involved the firing of two men from a private drug rehabilitation
organization because they used peyote for sacramental purposes at a cere-
mony of the Native American Church, of which they were members. 4 9
When the two men applied for unemployment benefits, the Department of
Human Resources of Oregon denied the applications because it determined
school attendance could result in great psychological harm to Amish children and could ultimately result
in the destruction of the Old Order Amish community. Id. at 212.
42. Id. at 235.
43. Id. at 218; see also Navajo Nation, 535 F.3d at 1069.
44. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 214.
45. Id. at 215.
46. Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 403; Yoder, 406 U.S. at 235; see also Brucker, supra n. 23, at 277.
47. Smith, 494 U.S. 872.
48. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-b ("The purposes of this chapter are-(1) to restore the compelling interest
test as set forth in Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) and Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972)
and to guarantee its application in all cases where free exercise of religion is substantially burdened; and
(2) to provide a claim or defense to persons whose religious exercise is substantially burdened by gov-
ernment.").
49. Smith, 494 U.S. at 874.
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that they had been discharged for work-related misconduct.50 The Oregon
Supreme Court concluded that the use of peyote for religious purposes was
prohibited by the State but held that this prohibition was in violation of the
Federal Free Exercise Clause.51 In so doing, the Oregon Court used the
Sherbert substantial burden test.5 2 The Court determined the plaintiffs' re-
ligious beliefs were sincerely held and that the state action imposed a bur-
den on the exercise of their religion; thus, the government had to show a
compelling government interest to justify its action.53 The Oregon Court
found no compelling governmental interest in insuring the financial integ-
rity of the state employment compensation fund, and thus held the state
could not deny unemployment benefits to the two men for engaging in their
religious practice. 54
The U.S. Supreme Court reversed the Oregon Court's decision by dis-
tinguishing Smith from the Sherbert line of cases.55 The Court determined
that the Oregon law prohibiting the use of peyote was a neutral law of
general applicability because it was not targeted at any specific religious
practice. 56 Rather, it was a criminal law that was generally applicable to all
people and was constitutional as applied to those who use the drug for other
reasons.57 The Court held that as a neutral law of general applicability, the
government did not need to show any compelling interest.58 The Court
determined, however, that if a challenge involved a "hybrid" claim, that is,
if more than one constitutional right were impacted by a single statute or
practice, the compelling interest test would remain applicable. 59 The Court
stated that "[t]he only decisions in which we have held that the First
Amendment bars application of a neutral, generally applicable law to relig-
iously motivated action have involved not the Free Exercise Clause alone,
but the Free Exercise Clause in conjunction with other constitutional pro-
tections," such as the freedom of speech, the freedom of press, or the rights
of parents to direct the education of their children. 60 Thus, the Court nar-
50. Id.
51. Smith v. Emp. Div., 307 Or. 68, 76 (1988), reversed, Smith, 494 U.S. at 876.
52. Smith, 494 U.S. at 875.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 876.
55. Id. at 883-884, 890.
56. Id. at 878.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 885 (stating "To make an individual's obligation to obey such a law contingent upon the
law's coincidence with his religious beliefs, except where the State's interest is "compelling"- permit-
ting him, by virtue of his beliefs, "to become a law unto himself," contradicts both constitutional tradi-
tion and common sense.") (citation omitted).
59. Id. at 881.
60. Id. at 881 (citing Cantwell v. Conn., 310 U.S. 296, 304-307 (1940) (invalidating a licensing
system for religious and charitable solicitations under which the administrator had discretion to deny a
license to any cause he deemed nonreligious); Murdock v. Pa., 319 U.S. 105 (1943) (invalidating a flat
2010 477
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rowed the circumstances under which the government must show a compel-
ling interest before imposing a burden on religious practices and even sug-
gested that the Sherbert test applied only in denial of unemployment com-
pensation cases.6' In essence, after Smith, a neutral law of general
applicability must be complied with regardless of whether it infringes on a
religious practice. 6 2  The Court suggested the political process, regardless
of its pitfalls for minority religions and practices, should be used to shield
religious exercise. 6 3 Indeed, Congress would quickly act in response to the
Smith decision, but not in the way the Court had suggested.64
B. The Enactment of RFRA in Reaction to Smith
Congress reacted to the Smith decision, not by making an exception to
proscriptive drug laws for sacramental peyote use, but rather by nullifying
the Smith decision and reinstating the Sherbert and Yoder substantial bur-
den test.65 The unexpectedly broad holding in Smith was not well received
by a large number of diverse religious groups and civil rights organiza-
tions. 66 These groups gathered support and launched an attack on the Smith
decision that culminated in the enactment of RFRA in 1993.67
Many organizations and religious groups considered the Smith deci-
sion to be a fundamental assault on their constitutional right to freedom of
religion and reacted with anger and shock.6 8 As recognized by the Court in
its decision, it would be the small unpopular religions that would be most at
tax on solicitation as applied to the dissemination of religious ideas); Yoder, 406 U.S. at 205 (invalidat-
ing compulsory school attendance laws as applied to Amish parents who refused on religious grounds to
send their children to school)).
61. Smith, 494 U.S. at 883-884. "Even if we were inclined to breathe into Sherbert some life
beyond the unemployment compensation field, we would not apply it to require exemptions from a
generally applicable criminal law." Id. at 884. Additionally, the Court warned that the Sherbert rule,
when applied to laws of general applicability, would produce "a private right to ignore generally appli-
cable laws." Id. at 886.
62. Id. at 878 (stating "if prohibiting the exercise of religion (or burdening the activity of printing)
is not the object of the tax but merely the incidental effect of a generally applicable and otherwise valid
provision, the First Amendment has not been offended.").
63. Id. at 890 ("It may fairly be said that leaving accommodation to the political process will place
at a relative disadvantage those religious practices that are not widely engaged in; but that unavoidable
consequence of democratic government must be preferred to a system in which each conscience is a law
unto itself or in which judges weigh the social importance of all laws against the centrality of all relig-
ious beliefs.").
64. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(a)(4), (b)(1); see Robert F. Drinan & Jennifer I. Huffman, The Religious
Freedom Restoration Act: A Legislative History, 10 J.L. & Religion 531, 531 (1993/1994).
65. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(b)(1).
66. Drinan & Huffman, supra n. 64, at 531. Support came from a large and diverse group of
religious and public interest organizations including the National Association of Evangelicals, the Amer-
ican Civil Liberties Union, and the Concerned Women for America, among others. Id. at 533.
67. Id. at 531.
68. Id. at 532.
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risk under Smith because they would be at the mercy of the legislative ma-
jority. 69 However, majority religions also saw a danger of increased vulner-
ability under Smith.70
Initially, the groups petitioned the Supreme Court for re-hearing, but
when that strategy failed, they focused their efforts on a legislative ap-
proach.71 Representative Stephen Solarz introduced the RFRA bill to the
House of Representatives in July 1990.72 However, it did not pass both the
House and the Senate until 1993, mainly due to concerns over abortion and
prisoners' rights issues.7 3 Eventually, the bill passed by wide margins and
was signed into law by President Clinton.7 4
C. Legislative Purposes Behind RFRA
The purpose of RFRA was
69. Smith, 494 U.S. at 890 (stating "It may fairly be said that leaving accommodation to the politi-
cal process will place at a relative disadvantage those religious practices that are not widely engaged
in."); see also Diana D. Stithem, Constitutional Law-The "Hollow Promise" of the Free Exercise
Clause: Denying the Right of Peyote Use in the Native American Church, 26 Land & Water L. Rev. 323,
335 (1990) (arguing "The Smith II majority left to the political process the fate of non-discriminatory
religious practice exemptions, even though the Court acknowledged that the political process might
place minority, non-traditional, religious practices at a disadvantage."); Drinan & Huffman, supra n. 64,
at 532.
70. Drinan & Huffman, supra n. 64, at 532 ("For example, a Christian wishing to take communion
might not be granted an exemption from a generally applicable statute prohibiting the consumption of
alcohol.").
71. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990), rehearing denied by, 496 U.S. 913 (1990). More than one hundred
constitutional law scholars joined the petition for rehearing, many motivated by the fact that none of the
briefs submitted to the Supreme Court had suggested that the Court change its free exercise doctrine.
Drinan & Huffman, supra n. 64, at 533; see also Keith Jassma, The Religious Freedom Restoration Act:
Responding to Smith; Reconsidering Reynolds, 16 Whittier L. Rev. 211, 218 n. 51 (1995). Oregon had
conceded in its brief that the compelling interest test should be applied to the plaintiffs claims, and a
possible change in doctrine was not suggested during oral arguments. Id. Usually the Court will request
additional briefing when it decides to reconsider precedents. Id.
72. H.R. Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the Comm. on the Jud., The Religious
Freedom Restoration Act of 1990: Hearings on H.R. 5377, 101st Cong. (Sept. 27, 1990) (Testimony of
Rep. Solarz speaking of the bill in the 101st Congress stated "It is perhaps not too hyperbolic to suggest
that in the history of the Republic, there has rarely been a bill which more closely approximates mother-
hood and apple pie . . . . In fact, I know, at least so far, of no one who opposes this legislation.").
73. Drinan & Huffman, supra n. 64, at 534-540. Among the concerns were pro-life groups that
feared the bill could be used to argue that legislation restricting abortions infringes on a woman's relig-
ious beliefs. Id. at 534. Additionally, a group of state attorneys general expressed fear that RFRA would
give prisoners support in their fights for various religious-inspired privileges, and this would be expen-
sive and raise security concerns. Id. at 539.
74. Id. at 531. RFRA passed the Senate on Oct. 28, 1993 with a vote of 97 to 2. 139 Cong. Rec.
S 1452 (daily ed. Oct. 26, 1993) (Letter from Robert Abrams, Attorney General of New York, to Senator
Edward M. Kennedy and Senator Orrin G. Hatch). When the bill was signed into law Rep. Solarz said
"With a stroke of a pen, the Supreme Court [in Smith] virtually removed religious freedom-our first
freedom-from the Bill of Rights." 137 Cong. Rec. E2422 (daily ed. June 27, 1991) (available at 1991
WL 114311).
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to restore the compelling interest test as set forth in Sherbert v. Verner, 374
U.S. 398 (1963) and Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) and to guaran-
tee its application in all cases where free exercise of religion is substantially
burdened; and to provide a claim or defense to persons whose religious exer-
cise is substantially burdened by government.75
In short, the bill was designed to "restore free exercise law to its pre-Smith
state."76
In restoring the substantial burden test, Congress intended to prevent
governmental restrictions of the free exercise of religion, unless a compel-
ling interest can be shown.77 The statute explicitly states that the govern-
ment shall not substantially burden a person's exercise of religion, even if
the burden results from a rule of general applicability, with only one excep-
tion.7 8 "The Government may substantially burden a person's exercise of
religion only if it demonstrates that application of the burden to the person
(1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and (2) is the
least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental inter-
est." 7 9 Any person whose religious exercise has been burdened illegally
can bring a claim under RFRA.8 0 Further, in enacting RFRA, Congress
expressed particular concern about the effect of the Smith decision on mi-
nority religions.81 Congress decided that legislation was needed to protect
the interests of minority religions because they generally lack the political
power to obtain legislative accommodations for their religious exercise. 82
It is important to note, however, that just because a claimant can show
a burden on his or her religious freedom, this does not guarantee a success-
ful suit.83 As one commentator noted, "The purpose of these statutes was to
ensure that the exercise of religion was not burdened unnecessarily, not that
the exercise wasn't burdened at all." 8 4 Thus, RFRA was carefully worded
to reinstate the compelling interest test that was in place prior to the Smith
decision, and this test did not necessarily, or frequently, lead to a victory for
75. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(b) (emphasis added).
76. Drinan & Huffman, supra n. 64, at 531.
77. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1.
78. Id. at § 2000bb-l(a).
79. Id. at § 2000bb-l(b).
80. Id. at § 2000bb-l(c) (stating "A person whose religious exercise has been burdened in violation
of this section may assert that violation as a claim or defense in a judicial proceeding and obtain appro-
priate relief against a government. Standing to assert a claim or defense under this section shall be
governed by the general rules of standing under article L11 of the Constitution.").
81. Id. at § 2000bb(a); Sen. Rpt. No. 103-111 at 8 (July 27, 1993) (available at 1993 WL 286695).
82. Sen. Rpt. No. 103-111, supra n. 81, at 8; H.R. Rpt. No. 103-88 (May 11, 1993) (Available at
1993 WL 158058).
83. Drinan & Huffman, supra n. 64, at 533.
84. Vikram David Amar & Alan Brownstein, Findlaw.com, The Navajo Nation Case, Which the
Supreme Court May Soon Review, and How It Reveals the Complex Balance Envisioned by the Relig-
ious Freedom of Restoration Act, http://writ.news.findlaw.con/amar/20090217.html. (Feb. 17, 2009).
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claimants. 5 Indeed, Congress concluded the compelling interest test "is a
workable test for striking sensible balances between religious liberty and
competing prior governmental interests." 8 6
IV. NAVAJO NATION v. U.S. FOREST SERWVCE: A CASE HISTORY
A final disposition in Navajo Nation v. U.S. Forest Service was de-
cided by a Ninth Circuit en banc panel in 2008.87 To properly understand
the Ninth Circuit's en banc holding, it is important to understand the history
of litigation over the development of the San Francisco Peaks in Wilson v.
Block, as well as the holdings of the district court and original three-judge
panel of the Ninth Circuit in the Navajo Nation case itself.
A. The Precursor to Navajo Nation v. U.S. Forest Service: the case of
Wilson v. Block
Litigation over development on the San Francisco Peaks began long
before the current Navajo Nation suit,88 and this litigation, specifically the
Wilson case, can be seen as a precursor to the current controversy.8 9 In
1981, the Navajo Medicinemen's Association filed suit against John R.
Block, the Secretary of the Department of Agriculture, along with the Chief
Forester of the U.S. Forest Service, the Forest Service itself, and the United
States.90 This suit was consolidated with similar suits brought by the Hopi
Tribe, as well as the owners of a nearby ranch, Jean and Richard Wilson. 91
The plaintiffs alleged, among other claims, that a proposed expansion of the
Snowbowl violated the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment. 9 2
The suit was initiated by the tribes in reaction to a decision by the
Forest Service to authorize a new development plan for the Snowbowl. 9 3
Development on the Snowbowl had been relatively light before this point. 9 4
85. Drinan & Huffman, supra n. 64, at 533; see e.g. Hernandez v. Commissioner of Internal Reve-
nue, 490 U.S. 680 (1989) (Church of Scientology was not entitled to tax deductions for costs of train-
ing); U.S. v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1981) (Amish employer not exempt from paying employer's part of
Social Security taxes).
86. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(a)(5).
87. Navajo Nation, 535 F.3d at 1058.
88. Wilson, 708 F.2d at 738.
89. Id.
90. Id. R. Max Peterson was the Chief Forester of the Forest Service. Id.
91. Id. The Wilson ranch was located one and a half miles below the Snowbowl. Id.
92. Id. (stating that the plaintiffs alleged a violation of the "American Indian Religious Freedom
Act, the fiduciary duties owed the Indians by the government, the Endangered Species Act, two statutes
regulating private use of national forest, the National Historic Preservation Act, the Multiple-Use Sus-
tained Yield Act, the Wilderness Act, the National Environmental Policy Act, and the Administrative
Procedure Act," in addition to the First Amendment claim).
93. Id. at 738-739.
94. Wilson, 708 F.2d at 738.
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Skiing began in 1937 when the Forest Service built a road and a lodge.95
The lodge was destroyed by fire in 1952 and replaced in 1956.96 Subse-
quently, ski lifts were built in 1958 and 1962, but until 1977 facilities at the
Snowbowl changed little.97 Then, in 1977 the Forest Service transferred the
permit to operate the ski area to a new company, and that company quickly
proposed a new master development plan.98
The Forest Service proposed and evaluated six alternatives under the
National Environmental Policy Act ("NEPA") and in 1979 adopted a pre-
ferred alternative for moderate development that was not one of the six
originally proposed alternatives. 99 The approved alternative consisted, in
part, of the clearing of 50 acres of forest for new runs, the construction of a
new day-lodge, three new lifts, and the paving and widening of the
Snowbowl road.100
The tribes argued that the expansion of the Snowbowl facilities would
violate their First Amendment right to freely practice their religion.o'0 The
tribes felt that development of the Peaks "would be a profane act, and an
affront to the deities, and that, in consequence, the Peaks would lose their
healing power and otherwise cease to benefit the tribes." 02 Despite insis-
tence that development of the Snowbowl was grossly inconsistent with the
tribes' beliefs, the Washington D.C. Court of Appeals held that the plain-
tiffs failed to show any burden on their religious beliefs or practices be-
cause there was no penalizing of a religion by the conditioning of govern-
ment benefits, as was the case in Sherbert. 03 In addition, the court deter-
mined that no burden was imposed on the plaintiffs' practice of their
religion because the development would not prevent them from engaging in
any religious practices, as the government had not impaired access to the
Peaks or the tribes' ability to gather sacred objects or perform ceremo-




98. Id. (stating that the Forest Service transferred the permit to operate the Snowbowl skiing facili-
ties from Summit Properties, Inc. to the Northland Recreation Company). Northland Recreation Com-
pany submitted a "master plan" for the future development of the Snowbowl to the Forest Service three
months after being granted the permit. Id.
99. Id. at 738-739.
100. Wilson, 708 F.2d at 739. The preferred alternative also allowed improvement of restroom facil-
ities, and the reconstruction of the existing chairlifts. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 740.
103. Id. at 741-742 (stating "Many government actions may offend religious believers, and may cast
doubt upon the veracity of religious beliefs, but unless such actions penalize faith, they do not burden
religion").
104. Id. at 744-745 ("The plaintiffs simply have not demonstrated that development will prevent
them from engaging in any religious practices."). Additionally, the court found: "The Forest Service ...
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Free Exercise Clause but that the status of the land as government land was
taken into account in its holding.105 The court held that government land
uses could never burden the right to freedom of belief, and could only bur-
den the right of freedom to practice if it was a site-specific religious prac-
tice. 106 Thus, because the court found no burden on the plaintiffs' exercise
of religion, it found no need to decide whether the government had a com-
pelling governmental interest in expanding the ski area or whether the For-
est Service's preferred alternative was the least restrictive means of achiev-
ing that interest. 0 7
B. Navajo Nation v. U.S. Forest Service in the United States
District Court
Since 1979, the Snowbowl has operated under the direction of the EIS
and the preferred alternative upheld in Wilson and many of the authorized
improvements have been implemented.108 However, another change in the
ownership of the Snowbowl in 1992 presented new issues and controversies
over future development.109 In 1992, the current owner and operator, Ari-
zona Snowbowl Resort Limited Partnership ("ASR"), purchased the
Snowbowl for $4 million and in 2002 ASR submitted a new Facilities Im-
provement Plan to the Forest Service for their approval.o10 After a lengthy
NEPA analysis, in 2005 the Forest Service issued its Final Environmental
Impact Statement ("FEIS") and Record of Decision ("ROD"), which ap-
proved "Alternative Two" of the FEIS."I That alternative included a pro-
posal to make artificial snow for the ski resort using treated sewage efflu-
ent, among many other improvements." 12
has not denied the plaintiffs access to the Peaks, but instead permits them free entry onto the Peaks and
does not interfere with their ceremonies or the collection of ceremonial objects." Id. at 744.
105. Id. at 744 n. 5.
106. Wilson, 708 F.2d at 744 n. 5.
107. Id. at 745; see also Robert J. Miller, Correcting Supreme Court "Errors": American Indian
Response to Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Association, 20 Envtl. L. 1037, 1053 (1990)
(showing that the Court in Lyng did not find a burden on religion that the Constitution could protect
under the First Amendment and thus, the Court did not move on to balance interests. Miller stated, "In
the majority's view, this was not a free exercise case because the Court did not find a constitutional
burden on religion, even though the road would "virtually destroy" the religion .... The Court did not
balance the interests because it did not find a burden.").
108. Navajo Nation, 408 F.Supp.2d at 870.
109. Id. at 869-870.
110. Navajo Nation, 479 F.3d at 1030.
111. U.S. Dept. of Agric. Forest Serv., Final Environmental Impact Statement for Arizona Snowbowl
Facilities Improvements 2-5 (2005) (available at http://www.fs.fed.us/r3/coconino/nepa/2005/feis-
snowbowl/index.shtml; see also Navajo Nation, 479 F.3d at 1030).
112. Navajo Nation, 479 F.3d at 1030-1031; Snowbowl EIS, supra n. 17, at 2-5. Other improve-
ments include an area for snow-play and snow-tubing, a new high-speed ski lift, relocation and upgrade
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In regard to the approval of the use of treated sewage effluent for
snowmaking on the Peaks, the FEIS approved in part:
(a) approximately 205 acres of snowmaking coverage throughout the area,
utilizing reclaimed water; (b) a 10 million-gallon reclaimed water reservoir
near the top terminal of the existing chairlift and catchments pond below Hart
Prairie Lodge; (c) construction of a reclaimed water pipeline between Flag-
staff and the Snowbowl with booster stations and pump houses [and]; (d)
construction of a 3,000 to 4,000 square foot snowmaking control building
113
A lawsuit filed by six tribes, several individual tribal members, and envi-
ronmental groups against the Forest Service soon followed, 1 4 alleging the
Forest Service failed to comply with the requirements of, among other
things, RFRA."15
The district court denied relief to the plaintiffs and held that the spray-
ing of treated sewage effluent on the Peaks was not a substantial burden on
the exercise of the plaintiffs' religion in violation of RFRA.1 1 6 Although
the court concluded that the plaintiffs' religious beliefs were sincere, the
court also concluded that the plaintiffs had failed to show any objective
evidence that the upgrades to the Snowbowl would impact the exercise of
their religion." 7 The court stated, "Plaintiffs have not identified any plants,
springs or natural resources within the [special use permit] area that would
be affected by the Snowbowl upgrades. They have identified no shrines or
religious ceremonies that would be impacted by the Snowbowl decision.", 1 8
Furthermore, the court noted that the Forest Service had guaranteed that
religious practitioners would still have access to the Snowbowl and approx-
imately 74,000 acres of the Coconino National Forest for religious pur-
poses.119
Additionally, the court held that no substantial burden could be shown
absent a showing that the government's land management decisions coerce
of three existing lifts, 66 new acres of skiable terrain, re-contouring of 50 acres of trail, re-contouring
and developing a three-acre beginners area, upgrading an existing lodge, and building a new lodge. Id.
113. Navajo Nation, 408 F. Supp. 2d at 871.
114. Id. at 869-870. The Plaintiffs in this consolidated case included the Navajo Nation, the Hopi
Tribe, the Havasupai Tribe, the Hualapai Tribe, the Yavapai Apache Nation, the White Mountain
Apache Nation, Bill Bucky Preston (a citizen of the Hopi Tribe), Norris Nez (a member of the Navajo
Nation), Rex Tilousi (a member of the Havasupai Tribe) Dianna Uqualla (a member of the Havasupai
Tribe), the Sierra Club, the Center for Biological Diversity, and the Flagstaff Activist Network. Id.
Defendants were the Forest Service, Nora Rasure, the Forest Supervisor, and Hary Forsgren, who was
the appeal deciding officer and Regional Forester. Id. In addition, the Arizona Snowbowl Resort Lim-
ited Partnership (ASR) was granted leave to Intervene as a defendant. Id.
115. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(b). Plaintiffs filed suit under RFRA, NEPA, and The National Historic
Preservation Act ("NHPA"). Navajo Nation, 535 F.3d at 1063.
116. Navajo Nation, 408 F. Supp. 2d at 906.
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someone into violating his or her religious beliefs or penalizes his or her
religious activity.120 The court determined that not only does the
Snowbowl decision not bar the plaintiffs' access, use, or ritual practice on
the Peaks, but also that "the decision does not coerce individuals into acting
contrary to their religious beliefs nor does it penalize anyone for practicing
his or her religion."121 The court was concerned with the effects that such a
holding would have on land management decisions, stating, "If the facts
alleged by the Plaintiffs were enough to establish a substantial burden, the
Forest Service would be left in a precarious situation as it attempted to
manage the millions of acres of public lands in Arizona, and elsewhere, that
are considered sacred to Native American tribes." 22 The court warned that
"allowing a subjective definition of substantial burden would open the door
to 'religious servitudes' over large areas of federal lands," which would
limit the government's ability to manage lands for multiple uses as Con-
gress had directed in the National Forest Management Act's multiple-use
mandate. 123 The Tribes appealed the district court decision to the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals. 12 4
C. The Three-Judge Panel of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
The Ninth Circuit three-judge panel unanimously reversed the district
court and ruled in favor of the Tribes on their RFRA claim. 12 5 The court
determined a substantial burden existed on the Tribes' right to the free exer-
cise of their religion due to the use of treated sewage effluent on the San
Francisco Peaks.12 6 The burden determined by the court fell roughly into
two categories.127 The first was the "inability to perform a particular relig-
ious ceremony, because the ceremony requires collecting natural resources
120. Id. at 904. The court referenced the Free Exercise Clause case Lyng v. N. W. Indian Cemetery
Protec. Assn., 484 U.S. 439, 449-453 (1988), which held that the law "does not and cannot imply that
incidental effects of government programs, which may make it more difficult to practice certain reli-
gions, but which have no tendency to coerce individuals into acting contrary to their religious beliefs,
require government to bring forward a compelling justification for its otherwise lawful actions." Id.
121. Id. at 905.
122. Navajo Nation, 408 F. Supp. 2d at 905.
123. Id. at 904 (finding that a substantial burden in a case such as this would lead to absurd results);
see Lyng, 485 U.S. at 452-453 (expressing concern that tribes may "seek to exclude all human activity
but their own from sacred areas of the public lands").
124. Navajo Nation, 479 F.3d at 1029. The Tribes appealed on their RFRA, NEPA, and NHPA
claims. Id.
125. Id. ("We reverse the decision of the district court in part. We hold that the Forest Service's
approval of the Snowbowl's use of recycled sewage effluent to make artificial snow on the San Fran-
cisco Peaks violates RFRA, and that in one respect the Final Environmental Impact Statement prepared
in this case does not comply with NEPA. We affirm the grant of summary judgment to Appellees on
four of Appellants' five NEPA claims and their NHPA claim.").
126. Id. at 1043.
127. Id. at 1039.
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from the Peaks that would be too contaminated-physically, spiritually, or
both-for sacramental use."1 2 8  The second burden was the "inability to
maintain daily and annual religious practices comprising an entire way of
life, because the practices require a belief in the mountain's purity or a
spiritual connection to the mountain that would be undermined by the con-
tamination."l 2 9
Rather than focusing, as the district court did, on the fact that the relig-
ious practitioners had access to most of the Peaks and could collect re-
sources outside of the area proposed for the spraying of effluent,130 the
Ninth Circuit focused on the beliefs of the practitioners themselves.131 The
court took an in-depth look at the beliefs of the Hopi, the Navajo, the Hu-
alapai, and the Havasupi, finding that although beliefs among the tribes
were somewhat different in nature, the use of treated sewage effluent on the
Peaks would impose a substantial burden on the religious exercise of all
four tribes.132 Additionally, the court determined that the burden fell most
heavily on the Navajo and the Hopi.133  It concluded those tribes' religious
practices had revolved around the Peaks for centuries, their practices re-
quired pure natural resources from the Peaks, and because their religious
beliefs dictate that the mountain be viewed as a whole living being, the
treated sewage effluent would contaminate the resources throughout the
Peaks.134
128. Id. This burden has been acknowledged by the Forest Service in its FIES which states,
"Snowmaking and expansion of facilities, especially the use of reclaimed water, would contaminate the
natural resources needed to perform the required ceremonies that have been, and continue to be the basis
for the cultural identity for many of these tribes [and] the use of reclaimed water is believed by the tribes
to be impure and would have irretrievable impact on the use of the soil, plants, and animals for medici-
nal and ceremonial purposes throughout the entire Peaks, as the whole mountain is regarded as a single
living entity." Snowbowl EIS, supra n. 17, at 3-19.
129. Navajo Nation, 479 F.3d at 1039.
130. Navajo Nation, 408 F. Supp. 2d at 905.
131. Navajo Nation, 479 F.3d at 1034-1044.
132. Id. at 1034-1038, 1044.
133. Id. at 1042-1043 (stating "The Forest Service wrote in the FEIS that the Peaks are the most
sacred place of both the Navajo and the Hopi."). Id. Although the Navajo object to the current use of
the Peaks as a ski area they consider the use of treated sewage effluent a far more serious problem. Id.
at 1040. Larry Foster, a Navajo practitioner training to become a medicine man put it this way: "I can
live with a scar as a human being. But if something is injected into my body that is foreign, a foreign
object-and reclaimed water, in my opinion, could be water that's reclaimed through sewage, waste-
water, comes from mortuaries, hospitals, there could be disease in the waters-and that would be like
injecting me and my mother, my grandmother, the Peaks with impurities, foreign matter that's not
natural." Id.
134. Id. at 1043 ("Navajo Appellants presented evidence in the district court that, were the proposed
action to go forward, contamination by the treated sewage effluent would prevent practitioners from
making or rejuvenating medicine bundles, from making medicine, and from performing the Blessingway
and healing ceremonies. Hopi Appellants presented evidence that, were the proposed action to go for-
ward, contamination by the effluent would fundamentally undermine their entire system of belief and
486 Vol. 71
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Additionally, the three-judge panel, unlike the district court, focused
on the particulars of the treated sewage effluent used on the Peaks, empha-
sizing the contaminating effect of the proposal to further its finding that a
substantial burden existed on the Tribes' exercise of religion.135 The court
emphasized that although the treated sewage effluent would satisfy the re-
quirements of Arizona law for reclaimed water, the water was by no means
pure.136 In fact, the resulting effluent still contained "detectable levels of
enteric bacteria, viruses, and protazoa [sic], including Cryptosporidium and
Giardia"l 3 7 after treatment. Further, "According to Arizona law, the treated
sewage effluent must be free of 'detectable fecal coliform organisms' in
only 'four out of the last seven daily reclaimed water samples,"' yet many
unidentified and unregulated residual organic contaminants are still con-
tained in the water.138 The court emphasized that the Snowbowl would be
the only and first resort in the country to make artificial snow exclusively
out of undiluted sewage effluent, which although it has been approved for
snowmaking in other locations, is not approved for full-immersion water
activities in which there is a potential for ingestion of the water.139 Further,
the Arizona department of Environmental Quality requires that users of this
water, for permissible uses such as flushing toilets, fire protection, and non-
self-service car washes, take precautions to avoid human ingestion. 140 The
court noted that the proposed action, depending on weather conditions,
would allow the spraying of more than 100 million gallons of effluent to be
deposited on the Peaks over the course of a winter season.141
Taking into account a detailed description of the Tribes' beliefs of the
mountain as a single living entity, along with the proposed action to spray
large amounts of sewage effluent on the Peaks, the court concluded the
action would impose a substantial burden on their exercise of religion. 142
The court then addressed the next two prongs of the test: (1) whether the
government's action was in furtherance of a compelling governmental inter-
est and (2) whether the action constituted the least restrictive means of fur-
the associated practice of song, worship, and prayer, that depend on the purity of the Peaks, which is the
source of rain and their livelihoods and the home of the Katsinam spirits.").
135. Id. at 1038-1039.
136. Id. at 1038.
137. Navajo Nation, 479 F.3d at 1038 ("The FEIS acknowledges that the treated sewage effluent
also contains "many unidentified and unregulated residual organic contaminates."); see also Snowbowl
EIS, supra n. 17.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 1039 (stating "The ADEQ approved the use of treated sewage effluent for snowmaking in
2001, noting that four other states already permitted its use for that purpose.").
140. Id. at 1038-1039 ("For example, users must 'place and maintain signage ... so the public is
informed that reclaimed water is in use and that no one should drink from the system'") (citing Ariz.
Admin. Code § R18-9-704(H) (2005)).
141. Id. at 1039.
142. Id. at 1043.
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thering that compelling governmental interest.14 3 The court determined that
authorizing the use of artificial snowmaking at an already functioning ski
area to expand and improve its facilities or to extend its ski season in dry
years was not a governmental interest "of the highest order."' 4 The court
concluded that the Snowbowl would continue to exist if the planned expan-
sion did not go forward, and that the purpose of the expansion was to make
the ski resort more profitable, which is not a compelling governmental in-
terest.14 5 Further, the court determined that a governmental interest in pub-
lic recreation did not justify the proposed expansion because even without
the Snowbowl, the public would continue to enjoy many recreational activi-
ties on the Peaks. 146 The court did acknowledge a compelling governmen-
tal interest in ensuring public safety on federal lands, but concluded that
there was no showing that approval of the proposed development advanced
that interest in the least restrictive means.14 7
Additionally, the court did not find a compelling governmental interest
in avoiding a conflict with the Establishment Clause of the First Amend-
ment, which states "Congress shall make no law respecting an establish-
ment of religion." 48 This is because not allowing the use of treated sewage
effluent on the Peaks would not favor the Tribes' religious beliefs and prac-
tices over all other interests, but instead it would permit an accommodation
to avoid "callous indifference."1 4 9 To support its finding of a substantial
burden and to give a sense of the harm caused to the Tribes by the Forest
Service's approval of the use of treated sewage effluent on the Peaks, the
court put forth the following example: "To get some sense of equivalence, it
may be useful to imagine the effect on Christian beliefs and practices-and
the imposition that Christians would experience-if the government were to
require that baptisms be carried out with 'reclaimed water.' "150 Thus, the
court held that there was a substantial burden on the Tribes' free exercise of
religion, and that the Forest Service's authorization failed both prongs of
RFRA's compelling governmental interest test.15'
Lastly, the court addressed the slippery slope concerns of the district
court as well as the chief case relied upon by the district court, Lyng v.
Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Assn.152 In Lyng, the Forest Service
143. Navajo Nation, 479 F.3d at 1043.
144. Id. at 1044.
145. Id. (emphasis added). The court added "We are struck by the obvious fact that the Peaks are
located in a desert. It is (and always has been) predictable that some winters will be dry." Id. at 1045.
146. Id. at 1045.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 1045-1046.
149. Id.
150. Navajo Nation, 479 F.3d at 1048.
151. Id. at 1042-1048.
152. Id. at 1047.
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planned to build a six-mile section of road connecting two preexisting roads
in the Six Rivers National Forest in northern California.15 3 The planned
road would cut through an area that had historically been used by several
Indian tribes for religious purposes.15 4 An Indian organization and individ-
ual tribal members sued the Forest Service claiming the construction of the
road violated the Free Exercise Clause because their religious practices re-
quired undisturbed naturalness of the area.'5 5 Despite the fact that the
tribes' religious practices would be severely impacted, the U.S. Supreme
Court held that building the road did not violate the Free Exercise
Clause.15 6 The Court was concerned that if the challenge was upheld, tribal
members "might seek to exclude all human activity but their own from
sacred areas of the public lands." 5 7
The district court and the Court in Lyng were concerned that if a chal-
lenge to government land actions was to be upheld, there would be no re-
strictions on the Tribes' ability to control the use of government land.' 5
The Ninth Circuit distinguished the situation in Lyng from the current chal-
lenge for two reasons.15 9 First, the challenge in Lyng was brought under the
Free Exercise Clause, but here the challenge was under RFRA, which has a
more demanding standard that must be satisfied to justify a burden on the
exercise of religion. 16 0 "Second, the facts in Lyng were materially different
from" the facts in Navajo Nation.161 In Lyng, the government had made
significant efforts to reduce the burden by locating the planned road so as to
reduce the auditory and visual impacts as much as possible.162 The Court in
Lyng found that aside from abandoning the project entirely so as to leave
"the two existing segments of road to dead-end in the middle of a National
Forest," it was "difficult to see how the government could have been more
solicitous."' 63 The equivalent to "abandoning the project entirely" in Lyng
would be abandoning the ski area altogether, which the Tribes did not
153. Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Assn., 485 U.S. 439, 442 (1988).
154. Id. at 443.
155. Id. at 443, 453.
156. Id. at 451.
157. Id. at 452-453.
158. Lyng, 485 U.S. at 452-453 (determining that the Tribes were seeking to exclude all human
activity but their own from the sacred areas of public lands); Navajo Nation, 408 F. Supp. 2d at 904.
159. Navajo Nation, 479 F.3d at 1047-1048.
160. Id. at 1047 (determining that the "exercise of religion" is defined more broadly under RFRA
than under the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment, among other differences). Thus, "The net
effect of these changes is that it is easier for a plaintiff to prevail in a RFRA case than in a pure free
exercise case." Id.
161. Id. (arguing "A developed commercial ski area already exists, and Appellants do not seek to
interfere with its current operation. There are many other recreational uses of the Peaks, with which
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seek.' " Additionally, in Lyng the government made significant efforts to
reduce the burden by shifting the location of a proposed road.'6 5  The
equivalent in this case would be restricting the operation of the Snowbowl
to that which could be sustained by natural snowfall.16 6
Hence, in Lyng, the Court "denied the Free Exercise claim in part be-
cause it could not see a stopping place."1 67 In contrast, the Ninth Circuit
panel upheld the RFRA claim in part because otherwise it did not see a
starting place for tribes, stating "If Appellants do not have a valid RFRA
claim in this case, we are unable to see how any Native American plaintiff
can ever have a successful RFRA claim based on beliefs and practices tied
to land that they hold sacred."168 The decision was well received by the
Tribes, but the Government and the Snowbowl petitioned for and were
granted a rehearing en banc by the Ninth Circuit.16 9
V. THE NINTH CIRCUIT EN BANC: A DRASTIC NARROWING
A Ninth Circuit en banc panel reversed the decision of the three-judge
panel and held that spraying treated sewage effluent on the Peaks would not
substantially burden the Tribes' exercise of religion. 170 The court started its
analysis by noting that the government does not have to demonstrate a com-
pelling governmental interest or show that its action involves the least re-
strictive means to achieve its purpose unless the plaintiff first establishes
there is a substantial burden on the free exercise of their religion. '7' Thus,
the court framed the issue in terms of whether there was a substantial bur-
den on the Tribes' religious practices so as to trigger the compelling interest
test.17 2 In holding there was no substantial burden on the Tribes' religion,
the court did not reach the issue of whether the government could show a
compelling interest or whether it achieved that interest using the least re-
strictive means. 73
The court looked to Sherbert and Yoder to define what kind of burden
on the exercise of religion was sufficient to invoke the compelling interest
164. Id.
165. Navajo Nation, 479 F.3d at 1047-1048.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 1048.
168. Id.
169. Navajo Nation v. U.S. Forest Serv., 506 F.3d 717 (9th Cir. 2007) (stating "Upon the vote of a
majority of nonrecused regular active judges of this court, it is ordered that this case be reheard by the en
banc court pursuant to Circuit Rule 35-3."); Navajo Nation, 479 F.3d at 1024, rehearing granted, 535
F.3d 1058 (2008).
170. Navajo Nation, 535 F.3d at 1063.
171. Id. at 1069.
172. Id. (stating "Of course, the 'compelling interest test' cited in the above-quoted RFRA provi-
sions applies only if there is a substantial burden on the free exercise of religion.").
173. Id. at 1070.
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test.17 4 The majority did not dispute that under the plain meaning of the
term, as defined in their own circuit's precedent, the Tribes would be able
to show a substantial burden on the exercise of their religion.' 7 5 Instead the
court determined that because RFRA specifically restored Sherbert and
Yoder, those cases, along with other federal pre-Smith rulings, controlled
the substantial burden inquiry. 17 6 Sherbert and Yoder led the court to hold
that "[u]nder RFRA a "substantial burden" is imposed only when individu-
als are forced to choose between following the tenets of their religion and
receiving a governmental benefit (Sherbert) or coerced to act contrary to
their religious beliefs by the threat of civil or criminal sanctions
(Yoder)."' 77 Thus, because neither of the above two mechanisms were em-
ployed against the Tribes in this case (the use of treated sewage water does
not force the Tribes to choose between following tenets of their religion or
receiving a governmental benefit, nor does it coerce them to act contrary to
their religion under threat of civil or criminal sanctions), the court con-
cluded that no substantial burden existed. 78
The court justified its narrow interpretation of "substantial burden" by
referring to the phrase as a "term of art" limited to the two types of burdens
imposed in Sherbert and Yoder, and thus, the term could not be interpreted
by reference to plain meaning.17 9 The court stated that "[t]he only effect of
the proposed upgrades is on the Plaintiffs' subjective, emotional religious
experience," and that "diminishment of spiritual fulfillment-serious
though it may be-is not a 'substantial burden' on the free exercise of relig-
ion." 80  Thus, because the majority failed to find that the spraying of
treated sewage effluent on the Peaks was a substantial burden on the Tribes'
exercise of their religion, it did not reach the question of whether there was
174. Id. at 1069.
175. The Ninth Circuit's own precedent requires an alleged burden prevent the plaintiff "from en-
gaging in [religious] conduct or having a religious experience." Navajo Nation, 479 F.3d at 1042 (alter-
ation in original) (quoting Bryant v. Gomez, 46 F.3d 948, 949 (9th Cir. 1995)).
176. Navajo Nation, 535 F.3d at 1069 (discussing the application of Sherbert and Yoder the court
stated "Therefore, the cases that RFRA expressly adopted and restored-Sherbert, Yoder, and federal
court rulings prior to Smith-also control the 'substantial burden' inquiry.").
177. Id. at 1069-1070 (explaining that any burden imposed short of those described in Sherbert and
Yoder is not a "substantial burden" within the meaning of RFRA and thus, does not require the applica-
tion of the compelling interest test).
178. Id. at 1070. The court found that "the sole effect of the artificial snow is on the Plaintiffs'
subjective spiritual experience . .. [t]hat is, the presence of artificial snow on the Peaks is offensive to
the Plaintiffs' feelings about their religion and will decrease the spiritual fulfillment Plaintiffs get from
practicing their religion on the mountain." Id. at 1063. "Nevertheless, a government action that de-
creases the spirituality, the fervor, or the satisfaction with which a believer practices his religion is not
what Congress has labeled a 'substantial burden'-a term of art chosen by Congress to be defined by
reference to Supreme Court precedent-on the free exercise of religion." Id.
179. Id. at 1074-1075.
180. Id. at 1070.
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a compelling governmental interest and what would be a least restrictive
means of furthering that purpose.'81
The court reached its decision due primarily to a slippery slope argu-
ment and concerns about restrictions on the government's management of
its own federal lands. 18 2 The court noted that if a substantial burden were
determined to exist in this case, then "any action the federal government
were to take, including action on its own land, would be subject to the
personalized oversight of millions of citizens."183 The court was concerned
that such a holding would, in effect, give individual veto power to every
citizen to stop a "government action solely because it offends his religious
beliefs, sensibilities, or tastes, or fails to satisfy his religious desires."184
Thus, a principle concern for the court was that under a less restrictive inter-
pretation of substantial burden, the number of claims could multiply to a
point where the United States would cease to function.185
The court concluded there was no substantial burden on the Tribes'
religious exercise and thus it did not reach the compelling government in-
terest test, in large part out of fear of a parade of horribles and a concern
that the government's use of its own land would be hampered. 186 The court
then affirmed the district court's entry of judgment for the Defendants on
the RFRA claim.18 7 The Tribes petitioned the Supreme Court to grant certi-
orari but were denied review.' 88
VI. THE NINTH CIRCUIT'S TEST: PROBLEMS AND EFFECTS
The issue of whether the use of treated sewage effluent for purposes of
snowmaking on the Snowbowl constitutes a substantial burden on the
Tribes' exercise of religion raises many concerns for religious liberty advo-
cates. 189 The problem of defining what is a "substantial burden" is a neces-
181. Id. at 1078; see also Miller, supra n. 107, at 1053 (stating that in Lyng "The Court did not
balance the interests because it did not find a burden.").
182. Navajo Nation, 535 F.3d at 1063.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Id. at 1064 ("No matter how much we might wish the government to conform its conduct to our
religious preferences, act in ways that do not offend our religious sensibilities, and take no action that
decreases our spiritual fulfillment, no government-let alone a government that presides over a nation
with as many religions as the United States of America-could function were it required to do so.").
186. Amar & Brownstein, supra n. 84, at 1.
187. Navajo Nation, 535 F.3d at 1078.
188. Navajo Nation, 535 F.3d 1058, cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 2763 (2009).
189. See Br. Of Amici Curiae The Friends Comm. on Natl. Legis. et al., in Support of Petitioners,
Navajo Nation v. U.S. Forest Serv., 535 F.3d 1058 (2008), petition for cert. filed, (No. 08-846); Br. of
Amici Curiae Relig. Liberty L. Scholars in Support of Pet. for a Writ of Cert., Navajo Nation v. U.S.
Forest Serv., 535 F.3d 1058 (2008), petition for cert. filed, (No. 08-846); Br. of Amici Curiae Nati.
Cong. of Am. Indians et al. in Support of the Petitioners, Navajo Nation v. U.S. Forest Serv., 535 F.3d
1058 (2008), petition for cert. filed, (No. 08-846).
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sary, but extremely difficult task.' 90 This controversial phrase is what the
parties and amicus curiae battled over in the briefs filed with the Supreme
Court.191 However difficult the task, the Ninth Circuit's interpretation of
"substantial burden" has some flaws that tribes and other religious groups
will have to contend with for years to come.192
A. The Ninth Circuit Interpretation of Substantial Burden is
Unduly Restrictive
The standard of what constitutes a substantial burden in the Ninth Cir-
cuit is unduly restrictive and is the narrowest interpretation of substantial
burden by any federal circuit court.19 3 Under the Ninth Circuit's interpreta-
tion, a substantial burden exists only when individuals are forced to choose
between following the tenets of their religion and receiving a government
benefit or when they are coerced to act contrary to their religious beliefs by
the threat of civil or criminal sanction.194 By limiting the notion of substan-
tial burden to only the two particular mechanisms by which the government
impacted religious practices in Sherbert and Yoder, the Ninth Circuit has
cut off claims arising from any other type of burden on religious practices
before it ever triggers the compelling interest test that RFRA specifically
established.195 This waters down religious protection by extinguishing
RFRA claims before the protections of the statute are triggered. 1 9 6
The measure of a "substantial burden" on religious practices should
not be judged by the way in which the government imposes the burden. '97
Rather, courts should consider whether, from the point of view of the prac-
190. Amar & Brownstein, supra n. 84, at 1.
191. Id.; see supra n. 189.
192. See id.
193. Pet. for Writ of Cert., Navajo Nation, 2009 WL 46999, *12-*19 (2009). For instance, the
Tenth Circuit has held that the government substantially burdens religious exercise when it "signifi-
cantly inhibit[s] or constrain[s] [religious] conduct or expression[;] ... meaningfully curtail[s] [an indi-
vidual's] ability to express adherence to his or her faith; or den[ies] . . . reasonable opportunities to
engage in those activities that are fundamental to [an individual's] religion. . . ." Werner v. McCotter,
49 F.3d 1476, 1480 (10th Cit. 1995). The Seventh Circuit has held that a "regulation that imposes a
substantial burden on religious exercise is one that necessarily bears direct, primary, and fundamental
responsibility for rendering religious exercise . . . effectively impracticable." Civil Liberties for Urban
Believers v. City of Chicago, 342 F.3d 752, 761 (7th Cir. 2003).
194. Navajo Nation, 535 F.3d at 1063.
195. See e.g. id. at 1088-1089 (Fletcher, J., dissenting) ("Neither Sherbert nor Yoder used the major-
ity's substantial burden test as the trigger for the application of the compelling interest test."). Judge
Fletcher stated "Neither Sherbert nor Yoder, nor any of the later cases, uses the restrictive definition of
'substantial burden' invented by the majority today." Id. at 1089.
196. Amar & Brownstein, supra n. 84, at I ("Of particular importance, the en banc panel held that
RFRA did not protect the Native American's in these circumstances because RFRA's threshold that
must be surmounted before the statute offers any protection-that a government action 'substantially
burden the exercise' of someone's religion-was not implicated.").
197. Navajo Nation, 535 F.3d at 1086.
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titioner, the government has in fact imposed such a burden that reaches the
level of substantiality that RFRA was designed to protect.s98 As Judge
Fletcher points out in his dissent to the Ninth Circuit en banc decision,
RFRA "does not describe a particular mechanism by which religion cannot
be burdened[;] [rlather RFRA prohibits government action with a particular
effect on religious exercise." 99 Indeed, RFRA states, "Government shall
not substantially burden a person's exercise of religion," 200 with no mention
of mechanism. The Ninth Circuit has changed the very nature of the ques-
tion by focusing on form over effect in examining how the government
imposes its burdens rather than on whether the government has in fact im-
posed a substantial burden.201
In interpreting the term "substantial burden" to be a rule of form rather
than of effect, the Ninth Circuit has taken away the flexibility needed in
determining what constitutes a substantial burden on the exercise of relig-
ion.2 0 2 The government acts in myriad ways, and religious beliefs are of-
fended in an equally vast number of ways.203 "Therefore, the important
question from the standpoint of religious freedom is simply whether gov-
ernmental action significantly interferes with religious practices, not
whether it happens to do so by the same means as a prior Supreme Court
case." 204
Due primarily to fears of a slippery slope, the Ninth Circuit has nar-
rowed the scope of RFRA to apply only when the government imposes a
substantial burden using two distinct mechanisms and thus has cut off
claims imposed by any other mechanism before such claims trigger the
RFRA mandated compelling interest test.2 05 The court feared that if the
substantial burden test were construed using its plain meaning then "any
action the federal government were to take, including action on its own
land, would be subject to the personalized oversight of millions of citi-
198. Id.; see also Pet. for Writ of Cert., supra n. 193, at *27 (arguing "No other approach would
make sense. The government acts in myriad ways. And religious belief, contrary to the Ninth Circuit's
suggestion, is inherently 'subjective.' Some religions are offended by autopsies; some are not. Some
are intimately tied to certain landmarks; some are not." (emphasis in original)).
199. Navajo Nation, 535 F.3d at 1086-1087 (emphasis in original).
200. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(a).
201. Navajo Nation, 535 F.3d at 1086; see also Pet. for Writ of Cert., supra n. 193, at *27.
202. Navajo Nation, 535 F.3d at 1090 ('The express purpose of RFRA was to reject the restrictive
approach to the Free Exercise Clause that culminated in Smith and to restore the application of strict
judicial scrutiny 'in all cases where free exercise of religion is substantially burdened."'). Additionally,
the Supreme Court has shown that it is entirely feasible to employ a case-by-case approach to challenged
government action in the one case in which the Court applied RFRA to government action. Gonzales v.
O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao Do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 436 (2006).
203. Pet. for Writ of Cert., supra n. 193, at *27.
204. Id.
205. Navajo Nation, 535 F.3d at 1063 (majority); Amar & Brownstein, supra n. 84, at 1.
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zens." 206 The court's concern of an individual veto power over government
actions and the parade of horribles that follows is unfounded.207 Instead of
giving every individual veto power over government actions, a plain mean-
ing reading of substantial burden would allow a case-by-case, flexible de-
termination of whether or not there has been a burden that rises to the level
of substantiality needed to trigger the compelling interest test.2 08 Once the
substantial burden requirement has been met, the government does not have
to stop its actions. 209 Instead, the finding of a substantial burden merely
triggers the compelling government interest test.2 10
When the compelling governmental interest test is triggered, the gov-
ernment must demonstrate a compelling governmental interest and show
that it has adopted the least restrictive means of achieving that interest.2 11
Although the compelling interest test is the most demanding test known to
constitutional law, a study has shown that the government satisfies the test
in 72 % of the cases involving religious liberty interests.212 Far from creat-
ing an untenable situation for land management and government action, al-
lowing a plain meaning of "substantial burden" simply requires the govern-
ment to justify its actions, striking a workable balance between religious
liberty and competing governmental interests. 213 Application of the com-
206. Navajo Nation, 535 F.3d at 1063.
207. Br. of The Friends Comm. on Natl. Legis. et al., supra n. 189, at 19 (stating after lengthy
argument that "The en banc majority's conclusion that to affirm a standard other than the sanction/
benefit test would subject the government 'to the personalized oversight of millions of citizens' and that
'[e]ach citizen would hold an individual veto to prohibit the government action,' is therefore unfounded.
It does not comport with the realities of the application of the strict scrutiny test to religious liberty
claims and there is no need to prevent legitimate claims of substantial (but not absolute) infringement of
religious liberty from being reviewed under the strict scrutiny test.").
208. Id. The compelling interest test will not overwhelm government activities because the test,
"which requires that the substantial burden 'is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest' and
'is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest,"' does not mean that
any religious exercise must be free of government interference. Rather it provides a mechanism "for
striking sensible balances between religious liberty and competing prior governmental interests." Id. at
18.
209. Id.
210. See Amar & Brownstein, supra n. 84, at 2. However, even when the compelling interest test is
triggered, it does not automatically mean that any religious exercise must be free from government
interference; rather, it strikes a workable balancing test. Br. of The Friends Comm. on Natl. Legis. et al.,
supra n. 189, at 17-18; Pet. for Writ of Cert., supra n. 193, at *29.
211. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 533-534 (1997) (holding that RFRA was unconstitu-
tional as applied to the States). RFRA, however, continues to apply to the operations of the federal
government. 0 Centro, 546 U.S. at 424.
212. City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 534; Adam Winkler, Fatal in Theory and Strict in Fact: An Empiri-
cal Analysis of Strict Scrutiny in the Federal Courts, 59 Vand. L. Rev. 793, 860 (2006) (demonstrating
that the federal courts subjecting governmental actions to strict scrutiny under RFRA or RLUIPA upheld
the actions 72 percent of the time).
213. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(a); see also Smith, 494 U.S. at 894 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("To say
that a person's right to free exercise has been burdened, of course, does not mean that he has an absolute
right to engage in the conduct . . . we have respected both the First Amendment's express textual
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pelling interest test will not lead to an inability of government to function,
as suggested by the Ninth Circuit en banc panel when it narrowed the inter-
pretation of "substantial burden" to two specific governmental mecha-
nisms. 214
B. The Ninth Circuit Interpretation of Substantial Burden is
Inconsistent with Congress's Purposes in Enacting RFRA
The Ninth Circuit's interpretation of substantial burden effectively ex-
cludes claims Congress specifically targeted for protection in enacting
RFRA and, as such, is inconsistent with the legislative purposes behind the
Act. 2 15 This restrictive interpretation of "substantial burden" places some
injuries outside the coverage of RFRA simply because they are imposed by
different mechanisms. 216 In so doing, the court has formally excluded one
kind of burden from coverage of RFRA, that of the state physically control-
ling and preventing the exercise of religion.217 As the dissent points out,
"[A] court would surely hold that the government had imposed a 'substan-
tial burden' on the 'exercise of religion' if it purchased by eminent domain
every Catholic Church in the country." 2 1 8 Yet this hypothetical government
action neither coerces Catholics to act contrary to their religious beliefs
under the threat of sanctions nor conditions a governmental benefit upon
conduct that would violate their religious beliefs and, thus, would fail to
trigger the compelling governmental interest test mandated in RFRA. 2 19
mandate and the governmental interest in regulation of conduct by requiring the government to justify
any substantial burden on religiously motivated conduct by a compelling state interest and by means
narrowly tailored to achieve that interest.").
214. Br. of The Friends Comm. on Natl. Legis. et al., supra n. 189, at 17-19; Pet. for Writ of Cert.,
supra n. 193, at *29.
215. Br. of Amici Curiae Relig. Liberty L. Scholars, supra n. 189, at 10-16 (describing many of the
situations that Congress specifically targeted for protection would not be protected under the Ninth
Circuit's test, including religious objections to autopsies, customs seizure of substances used in religious
ceremonies, religious freedom in prisons, and restrictions on the use of land by religious groups); Amar
& Brownstein, supra n. 84, at 2 (arguing specific religious liberties that Congress identified as the
"reasons for enacting RFRA would fall outside of the statute's coverage under the Ninth Circuit's"
interpretation of substantial burden).
216. Navajo Nation, 535 F.3d at 1091 (Fletcher, J., dissenting).
217. Amar & Brownstein, supra n. 84, at 2 (arguing that under the Ninth Circuit test "the state's use
of physical force and power to prevent the exercise of religion can never support a claim under RFRA").
218. Navajo Nation, 535 F.3d at 1090.
219. Id. at 1091 (stating "However, the majority's restrictive definition of 'substantial burden' places
such injuries entirely outside the coverage of RFRA because they are imposed through different mecha-
nisms than those employed in Sherbert and Yoder."). Further, "Excluding such cases from the coverage
of RFRA . . . contributes nothing to solving the real problem courts confront in interpreting RFRA-
deciding when a burden is too attenuated or insubstantial to warrant review under the statute. Under the
Ninth Circuit's standard, those core issues remain unresolved for all the cases in which coercion can be
alleged. All that the Ninth Circuit has accomplished is the rejection of one category of RFRA claims-
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One example of minority religious beliefs that Congress specifically
intended to protect but that would fall outside of the protection of RFRA
under the Ninth Circuit's interpretation of substantial burden deals with re-
ligious objections to the performance of autopsies. 220 When Congress en-
acted RFRA it was aware that due to the United States Supreme Court's
decision in Smith, the courts were regularly rejecting religious objections to
autopsies. 2 2 1 Some faiths believe that the performance of an autopsy vio-
lates the sanctity of the body and that if an autopsy is performed, the spirit
of the deceased will never be free. 2 2 2 Yet objections to government man-
dated autopsies would not satisfy the Ninth Circuit's interpretation of "sub-
stantial burden." 223 This is because the state's decision to perform an au-
topsy is not one in which the government has coerced families to act con-
trary to their religious beliefs under threat of sanctions or conditioned a
government benefit upon conduct that would violate their religious be-
liefs. 2 2 4 Under the standard set by the Ninth Circuit, "[T]he government's
rejection of religious objections regarding the handling of a deceased family
member's body would not be deemed to substantially burden religious exer-
cise."2 2 5  This result is contrary to the intent of Congress in enacting
RFRA.226
C. Have American Indians Been Effectively Written Out of RFRA?
American Indian religious concerns tied to sacred lands have also been
left without protection under RFRA.2 2 7 Congress enacted RFRA "[t]o as-
sure that all Americans are free to follow their faiths free from governmen-
and this categorical rejection seems arbitrary, given the history and purpose of RFRA." Amar &
Brownstein, supra n. 84, at 2.
220. Amar & Brownstein, supra n. 84, at 2.
221. See Sen. Rpt. 103-111, supra n. 81, at 8 (July 27, 1993) (stating "Since Smith was decided,
governments throughout the U.S. have run roughshod over religious conviction . . . Jews have been
subjected to autopsies in violation of their families' faith."); see also Yang v. Sturner, 750 F. Supp. 558
(D.R.I. 1990); Montgomery v. Co. of Clinton, 743 F. Supp. 1253 (W.D. Mich. 1990).
222. Douglas Laycock, The Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 1993 BYU L. Rev. 221, 226 (1993).
223. Br. of Amici Curiae Relig. Liberty L. Scholars, supra n. 189, at 11.
224. Id. (stating "The decedent's family will not receive a benefit for permitting the autopsy. More-
over, the government is not likely to coerce the decedent's family to permit an autopsy by threat of
criminal or civil penalty. In all probability, it will simply reject any objection and perform the au-
topsy."); Amar & Brownstein, supra n. 84, at 2 (stating "Obviously, however, government officials need
not threaten legal sanctions or the denial of benefits in order to perform an autopsy. Rather, they can
simply seize the body of the deceased and have the autopsy performed in a government morgue to which
offended co-religionists would be denied admittance.").
225. Amar & Brownstein, supra n. 84, at 2.
226. Br. of Amici Curiae Relig. Liberty L. Scholars, supra n. 189, at 11; Amar & Brownstein, supra
n. 84, at 2 ("That result seems plainly wrong.").
227. Navajo Nation, 479 F.3d at 1048.
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tal interference." 2 2 8 Yet under the Ninth Circuit's test, the beliefs of Ameri-
can Indians with regard to land they hold sacred have been left without any
protection.229
Indeed, the Ninth Circuit three-judge panel concluded, "We uphold the
RFRA claim in this case in part because otherwise we cannot see a starting
place. If Appellants do not have a valid RFRA claim in this case, we are
unable to see how any Native American plaintiff can ever have a successful
RFRA claim based on beliefs and practices tied to land that they hold sa-
cred." 2 3 0 The en banc Ninth Circuit's narrow interpretation of substantial
burden leaves no meaningful way for tribes to substantively protect sacred
sites that are under control of the federal government. 2 3'
D. What Do Tribes Do Now?
There are several approaches that tribes can use to work toward more
meaningful protection of their religious freedoms under RFRA. 2 3 2 One of
these is to educate the public, Congress, judges, lawyers, and courts as to
the nature of American Indian religious beliefs. Generally, judges will tend
to look at the burden on religious freedoms through their own religious
lens. 2 3 3 Most often this is a Judeo-Christian lens, which tends to view the
practice of religion in a specific physical space, such as a church. 2 3 4 It is,
therefore, inherently difficult for those with Judeo-Christian beliefs to un-
derstand the beliefs of others. 2 35 One such belief is at the center of this
case: the belief that the San Francisco Peaks are a single, living entity and
that the use of treated sewage effluent, even on one percent of the Peaks'
surface, would have an irretrievable impact on the use of the soil, plants,
and animals for medicinal and ceremonial purposes throughout the entire
Peaks.236
228. Sen. Rpt. 103-111, supra, n. 81, at 8.
229. Navajo Nation, 535 F.3d at 1063.
230. Navajo Nation, 479 F.3d at 1048.
231. Toensing, supra n. 25, at 2.
232. See Patricia Millett & Chastity Bedonie, American Indian Religious Freedom under the Relig-
ious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) and the "Substantial Burden" Burden, 34th Annual Federal Bar
Association Indian Law Conference, Course Materials, 75 (March 2009).
233. Id.
234. Id. at 65, 75 (stating "unfortunately, review of the cases inevitably raises the question whether
courts' familiarity and comfort level with a religious practice or other cultural norms subconsciously
influence the substantial burden analysis."); see also Miller, supra n. 107, at 1041 (stating "Usually, the
only Indian religious values that are upheld are ones that judges can analogize to Judeo-Christian
precepts. In the few cases where Indians have been successful in using religious claims, the courts have
analogized the Indian rites to more familiar Christian ones. This is an example of discrimination against
Indian religions because it shows that only those practices that are similar to Judeo-Christian religions
will be recognized as valid religious practices.").
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Indeed the majority in the Ninth Circuit en banc opinion discounted
the belief that the mountain is a single living entity. 237 Throughout the
court's opinion, it emphasizes that the ski area covers approximately one
percent of the San Francisco Peaks, implying that the impact is so small that
it would be absurd to claim a substantial burden on the Tribes' religious
exercise. 2 38 This conclusion discounts the belief that the mountain is a sin-
gle living entity. For instance, the court wrote, "According to the tribes, the
presence of the Snowbowl desecrates for them the spirituality of the Peaks
. . . Certain Indian religious practitioners believe the desecration of the
Peaks has caused many disasters, including the September 11, 2001 terrorist
attacks, the Columbia Space Shuttle accident, and increases in natural disas-
ters." 2 39 Furthermore, the court implied that everything is sacred to tribes
and that to recognize one place as sacred would lead to American Indian
control over all federal land in the west, which would make the Forest Ser-
vice's management task nearly impossible.2 4 0 The court noted "The district
court found the tribes hold other landscapes to be sacred as well, such as
canyons and canyon systems, rivers and river drainages, lakes, discrete me-
sas and buttes, rock formations, shrines, gathering areas, pilgrimage routes,
and prehistoric sites."24 1
By failing to recognize the sacredness of the San Francisco Peaks, the
majority undermined the findings of the district court and its own conclu-
sion that the religious beliefs of the Plaintiffs were sincere. 242 The court
was concerned that if every natural feature were sacred to the Tribes they
would have control over federal land management decisions.243 However,
this argument discounts the degree to which the San Francisco Peaks are
sacred to the Tribes and virtually forgets that the Tribes must show a sub-
stantial burden on their religion to trigger the compelling governmental in-
terest test.2 44 The original Ninth Circuit three-judge panel determined a
substantial burden existed in this case because the Peaks are the most holy
of places and the center of the Tribes' religious exercises. 245 In the future,
tribes contesting a land management decision over a mesa, gathering area,
237. See Navajo Nation, 535 F.3d at 1064-1066.
238. Id. at 1063 (stating "[the Tribes] contend that the use of recycled wastewater to make artificial
snow for skiing on the Snowbowl, a ski area that covers approximately one percent of the San Francisco
Peaks, will spiritually contaminate the entire mountain and devalue their religious exercises.").
239. Id. at 1064.
240. Id. at 1066 n. 7.
241. Id. ("Within the Southwestern Region forest lands alone, there are between 40,000 and 50,000
prehistoric sites. The district court also found the Navajo and Hualapai Plaintiffs consider the entire
Colorado River to be sacred. New sacred areas are continuously being recognized by the Plaintiffs.").
242. Navajo Nation, 535 F.3d at 1097 (Fletcher, J., dissenting).
243. See id. at 1064-1066 (majority).
244. Id. at 1096-1098 (Fletcher, J., dissenting).
245. Navajo Nation, 479 F.3d at 1042-1043.
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shrine, prehistoric site, or any other sacred site, must also prove that their
religious beliefs are sincere and that the burden on those beliefs rises to the
level of substantiality needed to trigger the compelling governmental inter-
est test.24 6 The inability of the court to recognize degrees of sacredness to
the Tribes, and its emphasis on physical harm, ignores the nature of the
Tribes' religious beliefs, allowing the court to determine that no substantial
burden results from the use of up to 1.5 million gallons of treated sewage
effluent per day on the Peaks. 2 4 7
If courts, judges, lawyers, Congress, and the general public were better
able to understand the nature of American Indian religious beliefs, a court
would be more likely to find a substantial burden. 248 Tribes may need to
relate the burden seen by American Indians to something that is more read-
ily understandable to the majority culture. 24 9 That is what the three-judge
panel tried to do by comparing the spraying of treated sewage water on the
Peaks to requiring Christian baptisms to be carried out with 'reclaimed
water.' 25 0 For better future determinations of what constitutes a substantial
burden to the religious exercises of American Indians, it is important to
continue educating the courts, Congress, judges, lawyers, and the public
about the practices and tenets of American Indian spirituality. 251
Additionally, American Indians may need to look to the legislature for
a fix or directly appeal to President Barack Obama to intervene.2 5 2 Further,
tribes can support the concerned citizens group Save the Peaks Coalition in
the group's recent efforts to sue the Forest Service alleging, among other
things, that the Forest Service failed to adequately consider the impacts of
potential human ingestion of snow made from reclaimed sewer water as
required under NEPA. 2 5 3 Ground can also be gained by working with other
246. See Navajo Nation, 535 F.3d at 1063 (majority).
247. Id. at 1096-1098 (Fletcher, J., dissenting).
248. Id. at 1097 (stating "Perhaps the strength of the Indian's argument in this case could be seen
more easily by the majority if another religion were at issue. For example, I do not think that the
majority would accept that the burden on a Christian's exercise of religion would be insubstantial if the
government permitted only treated sewage effluent for use as baptismal water, based on an argument
that no physical harm would result and any adverse effect would merely be on the Christian's 'subjec-
tive spiritual experience.' Nor do I think the majority would accept such an argument for an orthodox
Jew if the government permitted only non-Kosher food.").
249. Navajo Nation, 479 F.3d at 1048.
250. Id.
251. Millett & Bedonie, supra n. 232, at 65, 75.
252. Toensing, supra n. 25, at 2 (stating "If the high court denies a review, the tribes have the option
of seeking a legislative fix. . ."); see also Michael Kiefer, Tribes Lose Snowbowl Battle, Ariz. Republic
(June 9, 2009) (available at http://www.azcentral.com/arizonarepublic/news/articles/2009/06/09/
20090609snowbowl0609.html).
253. See Save the Peaks Coalition v. U.S. Forest Serv, Compl. at 11, (D. Ariz. Sept. 21, 2009)
(available at http://www.savethepeaks.org/images/stories/documents/nepadistrict-complaint.pdf) (com-
plaint filed on behalf of Save the Peaks Coalition and nine citizens in the U.S. District Court for the
District of Arizona against the U.S. Forest Service). The suit alleges the FEIS does not contain a reason-
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religious groups such as the numerous groups that supported the Tribes'
petition for certiorari to the Supreme Court, as well as those groups that
pressured Congress to adopt RFRA in the first place.2 54 Finally, working
with other religious groups to find a common ground and flexible meaning
of what constitutes a substantial burden may also help present religious con-
cepts to the courts in a more familiar context.
VII. CONCLUSION
With Navajo Nation, American Indian religious practitioners have
been effectively written out of RFRA. The Ninth Circuit's interpretation of
"substantial burden" under RFRA has made the question of what constitutes
a substantial burden one of form rather than effect by refusing to look to the
plain meaning of what constitutes a substantial burden on a religious prac-
tice. 2 5 5  Furthermore, it allows the government to stop claimants at the
threshold question of what constitutes a substantial burden, thereby prevent-
ing application of the compelling governmental interest test that Congress
mandated in RFRA and has decided is the most workable balance between
religious liberty issues and government actions.256 The Ninth Circuit's in-
terpretation of substantial burden also serves to exclude specific religious
liberties that Congress identified as reasons for enacting RFRA, and thus is
contrary to the purpose and intent of the statute. 2 5 7 American Indian relig-
ious exercise claims in relation to their sacred lands are one of the types of
claims that the Ninth Circuit's interpretation has effectively exempted from
RFRA, contrary to congressional intent.2 58
Recently, the Navajo Nation was denied writ of certiorari to the Su-
preme Court.2 5 9 It is now up to American Indian religious practitioners and
their advocates to educate the courts, Congress and the public about the
ably thorough discussion of the significant aspects of the probable environmental consequences of the
project because it ignores the possibility of children and others eating snow made from reclaimed sewer
water, that by failing to analyze the impact of eating snow made from reclaimed sewer water, the Forest
Service failed to ensure the scientific integrity of its analysis, and that the Forest Service failed to
disseminate quality information.
254. See Br. of The Friends Comm. on Natl. Legis. et al., supra n. 189; Br. of Amici Curiae Relig.
Liberty L. Scholars, supra n. 189; Br. of Amici Curiae Natl. Cong. of Am. Indians et al., supra n. 189.
See also Drinan & Huffman, supra n. 64, at 531 (noting that support came for a large and diverse group
of religious and public interest organizations including the National Association of Evangelicals, the
American Civil Liberties Union, and the Concerned Women for America among others).
255. Pet. for Writ of Cert., supra n. 193, at *27; Navajo Nation, 535 F.3d at 1086.
256. Id. at 1090; Br. of The Friends Comm. on Natl. Legis. et al. supra n. 189, at 17-19.
257. Amar & Brownstein, supra n. 84, at 2.
258. Navajo Nation, 479 F.3d at 1048 (stating "If Appellants do not have a valid RFRA claim in this
case, we are unable to see how any Native American plaintiff can ever have a successful RFRA claim
based on beliefs and practices tied to the land that they hold sacred.").
259. Navajo Nation, 535 F.3d 1058, cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 2763 (2009).
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nature of their spiritual beliefs in hopes that this will lead to a greater under-
standing of the burdens on their practice, and to work together with other
religious interests to secure a possible legislative fix for such an unfortunate
decision.
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